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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
New York has long recognized that a state is free, as a matter
of its own law, to impose greater protection to defendants than
those that the Supreme Court holds to be necessary under federal
constitutional standards. New York has done just that in the
constitutional realm of double jeopardy, as is apparent in the
New York Criminal Procedure Law, which provides greater
protections than those afforded a defendant under both State and
Federal Constitutions, which simply requires the prohibition
against double jeopardy for "the same offense." In the context of
the facts enunciated in Latham, C.P.L. section 40.20(2)(d)
legislatively articulates that under federal and state constitutional
analysis, the death of an injured person is the principal element
of homicide. It is the element that creates a separate offense from
attempted murder and permits successive prosecutions without
subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Mitchell 248
(decided October 25, 1993)
Defendant asserted that his right to be free from double
jeopardy under the State249 and Federal250 Constitutions was
violated when the court, which earlier granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct, later
denied the defendant's request for a dismissal of his indictment
248. 197 A.D.2d 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1993).
249. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "
Id.
250. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " Id. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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from the second trial. The appellate division held that the
prosecutor did not intentionally act to cause the defendant to
move for a mistrial and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not preclude reprosecution of the defendant. 251
During the first trial, the prosecutor called the defendant a
"pimp" in her opening statement.252 The defendant claimed that
the prosecutor acted with the intent to cause the defendant to
make a motion for a mistrial. 253 He contended that his indictment
in the second trial should have been dismissed because his filing
a motion for a mistrial was caused by prosecutorial
misconduct. 254  However, the court disagreed with the
defendant. 255 The court stated that there was no proof in the
record that showed the prosecutor "inten[ded] to provoke a
mistrial." 256 In addition, the court explained that without a
prosecutor's bad-faith intent or misconduct to cause the defendant
to move for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not be
a bar to reprosecution of the defendant. 257
In its reasoning, the appellate division referred to Schoendorf v.
Mullen.25 8 In that case, the defendant was charged with the
murder of his wife. 259 After the murder, the defendant made oral
statements to the police which were followed by a written
confession.2 60 The court ordered the suppression of certain
statements made during the oral confession because the defendant
was not given proper notice. 26 1 However, during the
prosecutor's opening statement, he improperly referred to the
suppressed statements. 262 The court granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial because the testimony was prejudicial and







258. 152 A.D.2d 715, 544 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1989).
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denied him a fair trial. 263 The defendant asserted that this motion
was caused by the prosecutor's misconduct and, as a result, he
claimed that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a retrial. 264
The court disagreed and stated that the prosecutor did "not
intend" to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. 265 The
court further commented that because the prosecutor did not
intend to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial, the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not prevent reprosecution. 266  The
defendant's claim was thus denied by the court.2 67
In its reasoning, the appellate division in Mitchell also cited
People v. Copeland.268 In Copeland, the defendant was arrested
for possession of a weapon.2 69 After his arrest, the defendant
remained silent for three and one-quarter hours.270 He then made
a statement to a detective. 27 1 The court stated that the prosecutor
could not impeach the defendant's testimony by referring to the
defendant's period of silence. 272 The prosecutor, however,
263. Id. at 715, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
264. Id. at 716, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see also Person v. Cooperman, 175 A.D.2d 898, 898-99, 573
N.Y.S.2d 627, 627 (2d Dep't 1991) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause was
not applicable because the defendant's motion for a mistrial was not
deliberately provoked by prosecutorial misconduct); People v. Putnam, 150
A.D.2d 925, 927, 541 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (3d Dep't 1989) (holding the
defendant should not be afforded double jeopardy protection because the
prosecutorial conduct was not intentional misconduct); People v. Presley, 136
A.D.2d 949, 949, 525 N.Y.S.2d 84, 84 (4th Dep't 1988) (holding there is no
evidence to show that the prosecutor's conduct was intentional to cause the
defendant to move for a mistrial and the defendant could be reprosecuted).
267. Schoendorf, 152 A.D.2d at 716, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
268. 127 A.D.2d 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1987).
269. Id. at 846-47, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
270. Id. at 847, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
271. Id.
272. Id. The appellate court explained that the defendant's silence for 3 1/4
hours after his arrest and before his statement to the detective is distinguishable
from important exculpatory information that a defendant intentionally omitted
from his statement to police after his arrest. Id. The intentional silence and
omissions made during a defendant's statement to police after his arrest can be
used to impeach the defendant's testimony during his trial. Id. However,
silence may not be used to impeach the defendant's credibility at trial when the
19941
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ignored the court's ruling and referred to the defendant's
silence. 273 Consequently, the court granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial. 274 In addition, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss his indictment from the subsequent trial because he
argued that the prosecutor intended to provoke him to move for a
mistrial. 275 The court reasoned that even though the prosecutor
may have acted intentionally, his action was not intended to cause
the defendant to make a motion for a mistrial. 276 The court held
that the prosecutor did not have a "bad-faith intent" and,
therefore, the defendant could be reprosecuted. 277
Similarly, in People v. Gemmill,27 8 the court held that the
defendant's reprosecution in the second trial was not barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 279 In Gemmill, the defendant was
arrested for robbery. 280 During the first trial a prosecution
witness made a prejudicial statement and the court granted the co-
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 281 In the second trial, the
defendant was convicted for robbery in the second degree. 282
The defendant contended that the second trial violated his






277. Id.; see also Ford v. Lagana, 157 A.D.2d 728, 728-29, 549 N.Y.S.2d
823, 824 (2d Dep't 1990) (holding the retrial of the defendant was not barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause because there was no proof of the prosecutor's
bad faith or intention to cause a mistrial); Jordan v. O'Dwyer, 152 A.D.2d
671, 671, 543 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (2d Dep't 1989) (retrial of the defendant
was not prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause because there was no proof
that the prosecutor intentionally acted in bad faith to provoke a mistrial);
People v. Ramos, 141 Misc. 2d 930, 938-39, 535 N.Y.S.2d 663, 669 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1988) (holding defendant could be reprosecuted because
the prosecutor's use of a chart during trial was not used in bad faith with the
intention to cause a mistrial).
278. 146 A.D.2d 951, 537 N.Y.S.2d 80 (3d Dep't 1989).
279. Id. at 953, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
280. Id. at 951, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 951-52, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
[Vol 10
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constitutional right against double jeopardy. 283 The court
explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial
only if the reason for the defendant's motion for a mistrial was
caused by the prosecutor's conduct which intended to cause the
defendant to move for a mistrial. 2 84 The court reasoned that the
misconduct was not intentionally caused in bad faith by the
prosecutor or the witness.285 Therefore, the court held that since
there was no prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant's
constitutional right pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not preclude the second trial.
2 86
More recently, in Roman v. Brown,2 87 the defendant filed a
motion for a mistrial because of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct.2 88 He claimed that a retrial was precluded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause because his motion was a result of the
prosecutor's misconduct. 289 However, the court disagreed with
the defendant. 290 The court stated that there was no proof that the
prosecutor acted with a "bad-faith intent" to make the defendant
file a motion for a mistrial. 291 The court, therefore, denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. 292
283. Id. at 952, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
284. Id.; see also Collins v. Quinones, _ A.D.2d . ... 606
N.Y.S.2d 306, 306 (2d Dep't 1994) (retrial of defendant was not prevented by
the Double Jeopardy Clause because there was no evidence that the prosecutor
intentionally acted to provoke a mistrial); Owen v. Harrigan, 131 A.D.2d 20,
23, 520 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (3d Dep't 1987) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause
did not prevent the defendant's retrial because there was no proof that the
prosecutor intended to cause a mistrial); People v. Sorenson, 118 A.D.2d 607,
608, 499 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that the prejudicial
testimony elicited by the prosecutor during the defendant's prior trial did not
constitute prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor did not intend to
cause a mistrial).
285. Gemmill, 146 A.D.2d at 952-53, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
286. Id. at 953, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
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In Mitchell, the defendant asserted that because the prosecutor
called the defendant a "pimp" in her opening statement, the
prosecutor intentionally caused the defendant to move for a
mistrial. 2 93 In applying the facts in Mitchell to the holdings of
Schoendorf, Copeland, Gemmill and Roman, they are similar to
and in agreement with the holding in Mitchell. Therefore, the
New York courts have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause will
not bar reprosecution when there is no evidence to show that the
prosecutor's conduct intentionally caused the defendant to move
for a mistrial.
Federal case law in this area is in accord with New York case
law. In support of its reasoning, the court in Mitchell referred to
and quoted the Supreme Court case, Oregon v. Kennedy. 294 In
this case, the defendant was arrested for theft. 295 During the
defendant's first trial, in the prosecutor's redirect examination of
a witness, he referred to the defendant as a "crook."' 296 The
defendant then filed a motion for a mistrial which was granted by
the trial court. 2 97 After the prosecution attempted to reprosecute,
the defendant claimed that, because of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the charges should have been dismissed. 298 The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to bar the retrial because the
prosecutor did not intend to cause the defendant to move for a
mistrial. 299 The state appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision and held that the retrial was barred because the
prosecutor's misconduct was "overreaching." 300 However, the
Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's ruling. 30 1
The Court explained that -a defendant will be afforded the
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second trial
only when the governmental conduct intends to "goad" the
293. Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d. at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
294. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).




299. Id. at 669-70.
300. Id. at 670.
301. Id. at 671.
874 [Vol 10
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defendant to make a motion for a mistrial. 302 The Court further
stated, that even if a defendant's motion for a mistrial is granted,
this will not preclude a retrial "absent intent on the part of the
prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause." 30
3
Federal case law in this area has applied the rationale and
holding of Oregon v. Kennedy. In United States v. Huang,304 the
Second Circuit stated that the defendant is protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause from reprosecution only when the
governmental conduct provoked the defendant into making a
motion for a mistrial. 305 The court determined that the
governmental conduct was not intended to cause the defendant to
move for a mistrial.3 06 Therefore, the Second Circuit denied the
defendant's motion and held that the defendant's constitutional
rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated. 3
07
302. Id. at 676.
303. Id.; see also Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 34 (1977) (holding
that the errors alleged by the defendant did not bar reprosecution because such
errors were not intentionally made in bad faith or to provoke a mistrial);
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (holding that the defendant
could be retried because the trial judge's action of having the respondent's
counsel removed during the trial was not intentionally done in bad faith to
cause the defendant to move for a mistrial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104
(1977).
304. 960 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1992). The defendants were charged with
racketeering and kidnapping. Id. at 1130. In the first trial, the interpreter hired
by the Assistant United States Attorney for the defendant was not certified and
he was also an employee of the United States Attorney, not the court. Id. at
1132. Instead of interpreting the defendant's testimony accurately, the
interpreter summarized the testimony. Id. at 1131. The defendants asserted that
reprosecution violated their constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. at 1133.
305. Id.; see also United States v. G.A.F. Corp., 884 F.2d 670, 673-74 (2d
Cir. 1989) (court applied the reasoning in Kennedy and stated that the
prosecutor's conduct was "not intended to goad" the defendant to move for a
mistrial); United States v. Rivera, 802 F.2d 593, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1986) (court
determined that the standard for prosecutorial misconduct as defined in
Kennedy also applies to conduct by a trial judge), aff'd, 812 F.2d 713 (2d Cir.
1987).
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Accordingly, under the State and Federal Constitutions the
Double Jeopardy Clause will bar a second trial of the defendant
only where the prosecutor intentionally caused or provoked the
defendant to make a motion for a mistrial. In applying the facts in
Mitchell under the State and Federal Constitutions, the defendant
could only be afforded protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if he could prove that the prosecutor intentionally acted to
cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. However, without a
showing of this type of prosecutorial misconduct, reprosecution
of the defendant will not be precluded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Thus, the court in Mitchell, which held that
reprosecution of the defendant was not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause because there was no evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, is in accord with the State and Federal Constitutions.
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Lowe308
(decided June 3, 1993)
Defendant challenged his criminal conviction, which followed a
mistrial and a second trial, and claimed that relitigation was
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State309 and
Federal310 Constitutions. 311 The court held that because it was
the defendant himself who requested a mistrial during the original
proceedings, retrial of the action was not improper. 312
On November 1, 1991, defendant was convicted on two counts
of "criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree" 313 in
308. 194 A.D.2d 825, 598 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1993).
309. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in part: "No person shall
be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id.
310. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
311. Lowe, 194 A.D.2d at 826,598 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 825, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
[Vol 10876
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